This paper studies the effects of financial deepening and fiscal policy on human capital formation, working hours and growth in a model with financial frictions and productivity heterogeneity. The paper first shows that in the range of capital tax rates that attains a balanced growth path, taxation exerts inverted U-shaped effects on growth. The paper then analytically derives and shows that the growth maximizing tax rate and the corresponding growth are increasing concave functions of the financial deepening level. Finally, it is shown that theoretical predictions of the model are in line with data from OECD countries.
Introduction
This paper studies the effects of financial deepening and fiscal policy on human capital formation, working hours, and growth. It is motivated by several empirics documented from OECD countries. First, there are remarkable differences in the level of financial deepening and human capital among OECD countries. Figure 1 shows that the Private Credit indicator that reflects financial deepening in the USA and Japan is about 10 times that in Turkey and Mexico. The average years of schooling and the level of human capital in America are about 2 times higher than that in Turkey and Mexico. 1 Second, countries with deeper financial markets tend to work less hours but have higher levels of human capital. Data also reveals that there are strong and significant correlations between public spending per capita on education and health and human capital. This paper, therefore, aims to investigate the interactions between financial deepening and working hours, human capital formation and growth in a human capital based endogenous growth model with financial frictions and public spending on human capital formation.
In particular, in the presence of financial imperfections and borrowing collateral constraints, the amounts of funds that one can borrow is limited by his own wealth and the development level of the whole financial systems. Therefore, productive entrepreneurs are often unable to borrow sufficiently to extend production while less productive ones participate in producing goods. 2 As a result, physical capital is not efficiently allocated and there are losses in aggregate productivity and growth. This paper addresses the question of whether the government can step in to improve the aggregated marginal product of capital and growth when human capital is accumulated and influenced by public spending.
To that end, this paper constructs a highly tractable two-sector human capital based endogenous growth model with a continuum of heterogeneous entrepreneurs, a continuum of representative workers, and the government. Entrepreneurs own private firms that produce goods, accumulate personal wealth and face borrowing collateral constraints. Representative workers accumulate human capital by using their own efforts, the existing human capital stock and public services provided by the government. The government collects capital taxes to finance its public spending on human capital formation. Capital market equilibrium implies that there exists a threshold of entrepreneurs who are active in producing goods and this productivity cut-off depends only on the financial deepening level of the economy. The paper shows that when human capital accumulation is sufficiently efficient and/or the return of public spending on human capital is sufficiently high then there exists a range of policy tax rate on capital that yields a balanced-growth path whose rate increases with the financial deepening level. Intuitively, when financial markets deepen, the borrowing collateral constraint of productive entrepreneurs is relaxed and productivity cut-off increases, which in turns leads to increases in aggregate productivity, demand for effective labor and returns of input factors. An increase in the capital rental rate facilitates physical capital accumulation while a rise in the wage rate allows workers to work less hours and encourages them to spend more time on accumulating human capital. Therefore, economic growth rises. This paper then theoretically explores the effects of fiscal policy. It shows that capital taxation exerts inverted U-shaped effects on growth and the growth maximizing tax rate is an increasing concave function of financial deepening level. The intuition goes as follows. In the presence of financial imperfections, the aggregated marginal product of capital is higher than the capital rental rate because the former is equal to the average marginal product of capital of all active productive entrepreneurs whereas the latter is equal to that of entrepreneurs at the productivity cut-off. Since only active entrepreneurs utilize effective labor, the government can increase the aggregated marginal product of capital by promoting human capital formation with the capital taxation cost incurred by savers who would just receive lower capital rental rate.
More specifically, an increase in the capital tax rate affects growth via four main channels. It first directly discourages the accumulation of capital, hence negatively affecting growth. Second, it promotes the formation of human capital so positively affects growth. Third, an increase in capital taxation by lowering the physical human capital ratio positively influences the aggregated marginal product of capital. Fourth, an increase in the physical human capital ratio inversely affects the accumulation of human capital. Therefore, suppose that the economy is initially at an equilibrium in which human capital related public spending is very low because of a very low taxation. At this equilibrium, the physical human capital ratio is very high and workers spend a little time on accumulating human capital. Consequently, both the human capital accumulation rate and the aggregated marginal product of capital are very low and so as is the balanced growth path rate. When the government starts raising the capital tax rate to spend more on human capital formation, it discourages the accumulation of physical capital with a higher tax but at the same time leads to a fall in the physical human capital ratio. Because of diminishing returns to physical capital of goods production function and diminishing returns to human capital of the human capital accumulation technology, an increase in tax rate from a relatively low level to leads to increases in the human capital accumulation rate and also the aggregated marginal product of capital minus the rising capital tax rate. As a result, the equilibrium growth rate increases. However, when the policy tax rate becomes very high, the positive gains from public spending on human capital becomes relatively smaller as compared to the associated negative effects. Consequently, the implied equilibrium growth rate becomes lower with a higher tax rate. Related Literature: This paper belongs to the large literature that studies the relationships between financial market frictions and economic development. 3 It is broadly related to the branch of literature that addresses the role of heterogeneity on the macroeconomy in the presence of financial frictions that is seminally developed by Galor and Zeira (1993) . It is closely related to the branch of literature studying the interactions between entrepreneurship, financial frictions, and productivity (see e.g. Buera, Kaboski, and Shin 2011; Buera and Shin 2013; Midrigan and Xu 2014; Moll 2014) . 4 It contributes to this branch of literature by incorporating taxation and the human capital formation into an endogenous growth model and shows that growth can be affected by fiscal policy and the level of financial development. To my best knowledge, this paper represents a first attempt to embrace financial frictions and heterogeneous agents in lines with Moll (2014) into a human capital based endogenous growth model developed by Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988) . 5 This model however differs from the traditional Uzawa-Lucas framework by incorporating the productive role of public services in the spirit of Barro (1990) in the process of human capital accumulation by skilled workers. 6 Moreover, since this paper incorporates taxation it differs from Antunes, Cavalcanti, and Villamil (2008) , which addresses the effects of financial development on entrepreneurial capital accumulation, firm size, output and income inequality in the presence of heterogeneity with respect to wealth and ability.
This paper is also close to Itskhoki and Moll (2019) that studies the optimal dynamic Ramsey policies in a one-sector growth model with financial frictions and productivity heterogeneity. The differences are that Itskhoki and Moll (2019) does not incorporate human capital accumulation and the associated government policy; it focuses on the optimal transfer policies in the product and factor markets in a steady state equilibrium framework. This paper addresses pro-growth policy on the balanced-growth path equilibrium in a humancapital based endogenous growth framework. In the absence of human capital accumulation, Itskhoki and Moll (2019) shows that it is always optimal to subsidize entrepreneurs by taxing workers. By contrast, this paper shows that when human capital is accumulated and influenced by public spending, conclusions of Itskhoki and Moll (2019) may no longer hold.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model economy. Section 3 analyzes the effects of fiscal policy in a balanced-growth path equilibrium and then compare the model's theoretical predictions with regularities documented from data of OECD countries. Section 4 concludes.
The model
This is a two-sector growth model with a unit measure of heterogeneous entrepreneurs, a continuum of representative workers, and the government. Each entrepreneur owns a private firm and is indexed by their productivity, z, and their personal wealth, a. Heterogeneous firms combine effective labor and physical capital to produce homogenous final goods used for consumption and physical capital accumulation. Human capital is accumulated by worker's own efforts, the existing level of human capital stock and also public services provided by the government. The government collects tax to finance its spending.
The representative worker
The representative worker has the following preferences,
where ρ is the discount rate and c w is the worker's consumption. At time t, this worker is endowed with one unit of non-leisure time and has accumulated the level h(t) of human capital. He then chooses a fraction u(t) of his time to supply u(t)h(t) units of effective labor at a competitive labor market at a wage w(t). The worker uses the left fraction of his time 1 − u(t) to increase his level of human capital stock via the following technology:
where G(h, g e ) is an increasing function of the existing human capital stock, h and the level of public spending on human capital formation, g e that are provided by the government.
Human capital in this model should be interpreted in broad terms so its formation includes education and training, wealth improvements, and also having and raising children. Therefore, the main feature that distinguishes the process of accumulating human capital stock in (2) from the existing literature is that human capital formation is influenced by the level of public spending/services on human capital. 7 This assumption is motivated by the fact that in many countries public spending often accounts for a lion share of total spending on education and health, particularly at the early ages. In these countries, the government usually subsidizes the expenses of having and raising children and covers the compulsory education. 8 The assumption that public services is an input of human capital formation is also close to Barro (1990) where public services is an input of the aggregate production function. In this model, 1 − u, can be interpreted as the flow of the private investment level, h can be interpreted as the number of teachers and the existing knowledge stock while g e is the flow of public services related to human capital.
We assume that the worker is hand-to-mouth and consume all his labor incomes. This assumption can be justified by the facts that in the US Top 20% controls about 95% of the total US financial assets (Wolff 2017) and that around one-third of all households in the America, Canada, Germany and the UK live hand to mouth based on 2010 data (Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner 2014) . 9 Hence, the budget constraint of the hand-to-mouth worker can be expressed as follows:
The worker optimizes the sum of discounted utilities from consumption (1) subject to the budget constraint (3) and his human capital accumulation (2) while taking the wage rate w(t) and the amount of public spending on education g e (t) as given. The optimization conditions imply that optimal allocating time to work, u(t), will obey the following differential equations: 10̇=
The equation (4) implies that public spending can affect the dynamics of working hours. In particular, for a given level of human capital, if public spending are sufficiently high then the RHS of (4) is positive, which then implies that the worker will increase his working hours. By contrast, if public spending is sufficiently low so that the RHS of (4) is negative then the worker will choose to decrease his working hours and the fraction of time devoted to accumulate human capital will increase over time.
Entrepreneurs
All entrepreneurs have the same preferences,
where c e expresses entrepreneur's consumption. Each entrepreneur owns a private firm that produces homogenous final goods. At each time, t, this firm employs n d units of effective labor from the competitive labor market at the wage rate, w(t) and rents k d units of physical capital at the rental rate, r(t), to produce final goods with the following production technology,
where z denotes idiosyncratic productivity and can be interpreted as individual entrepreneurial ability or efficiency level of capital. We assume that idiosyncratic productivity z is drawn from the following Pareto distribution function Q(z)
where φ is the shape parameter. Smaller φ corresponds to a heavier tail of the productivity distribution, i.e. a higher fraction of very productive entrepreneurs, therefore, implying a higher degree of productivity heterogeneity among entrepreneurs. We also assume that idiosyncratic productivity z is i.i.d over time as well as across entrepreneurs so that the law of large numbers implies that the population share of type z entrepreneurs is stationary and deterministic.
The assumption of Pareto distribution for productivity, apart from its analytical convenience, is justified by empirical work. In particular, Axtell (2001) shows that the Pareto distribution well captures the entire firm size distribution for the US firms using 1997 data. Luttmer (2007) constructed a stochastic balanced growth model in which the stationary firm size follows a Pareto distribution. In the recent literature of trade with heterogeneous firms that is built on the work of Melitz (2003) , Pareto distribution is widely used to describe the productivity distribution of firms (to name a few: Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple 2004; Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz 2011) .
Each time, an entrepreneur receives profits from his private firm and capital returns from his personal assets but need to pay capital tax to the government. 11 Hence, an entrepreneur's wealth a(t) evolves as follows: 12
where ( , , ) ≡ ( , , ) − − , denotes his firm profits and τ is the policy tax rate imposed by the government.
The entrepreneur at the same time faces the following borrowing constraint:
where λ denotes the maximum borrowing leverage ratio that reflects the degree of financial deepening. The borrowing constraint, which can be re-expressed as k ≤ λa, states that the maximum amount of capital an individual entrepreneur can borrow is limited by the amount of his personal assets, a, and the efficiency of the financial markets reflected by the maximum borrowing leverage ratio λ. In particular, λ = 1 expresses financial autarky where entrepreneurs are completely capital self-financed whereas λ = ∞ denotes perfect financial markets where entrepreneurs can borrow freely regardless of the personal wealth.
This collateral constraint specification reflects theoretical implications of models with a limited enforcement problem. For example, consider an entrepreneur who have personal wealth a deposited at the financial intermediary rents k unit of capital. In the presence of the limited enforcement, the entrepreneur can run away with a fraction 1 of the rented capital and just forfeits his personal wealth a. However, the entrepreneur will still able to rent capital again in the future. In the equilibrium the financial markets will rent capital only to the level that no entrepreneur would renege on the contract so that ≤ . The parameter lambda captures the strength and development of the financial markets. Note that this type of constraints is static and it rules out long term contracts that take into account problems such as incentive compatibility (see e.g. Kehoe and Levine 2001) but it makes the model highly tractable. 13 Each entrepreneur maximizes his private firm's profits subject to the technology (6) and the borrowing constraint (9) as follows,
The optimization conditions of this problem imply that individual entrepreneurs' profit, capital and effective labor demands are linear in personal wealth, and there is a productivity cutoff for active entrepreneurs z as follows:
Entrepreneurs also maximize the expected sum of discounted utilities from consumption (5) subject to the budget constraint (8), which can now be rewritten as:
Let V(a, z, t) be the value function of this optimality problem, then the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is set as follows,
This in turn implies the optimal consumption rule, c(t) = ρa(t). 14 Consequently, we obtain the following optimal saving policy function, which is linear in wealth.
The government
For simplicity, we assume that each time the government collects tax from the entrepreneurs at a policy tax rate τ and spends on public education, training and health for the accumulation of human capital. The budget constraint of the government then states:
where ϕ(a, z) is the joint distribution of productivity and wealth.
The aggregation
An equilibrium in this economy is sequences of factor prices and corresponding quantities such that (1) the representative worker and each entrepreneur maximize their expected sum of discounted utilities subject to their corresponding budget constraint taking as given equilibrium prices and a tax policy, (2) the government budget constraint (16) balances and (3) the factor markets clear at each point in time as follows,
The aggregate equilibrium dynamics of the model economy can be summarized up in the following Lemma. 15
Lemma 1
For a given policy tax rate τ, the dynamics of the aggregates and the fraction of non-leisure time assigned to goods production can be expressed as:
where the productivity cutoff and the measured aggregate productivity level are,
Finally, the wage rates and the capital return are given by,
There are two important implications from this Lemma as pointed out in Moll (2014) . One is that that a higher λ that reflects deeper financial markets implies higher measured productivity A. The other is that the distortions in the capital market due to financial frictions are expressed in the rental rate equation (27) as, = −1̄<̄, wherē= −1 ( ℎ) 1− is the aggregated marginal product of capital implied from the aggregated production (19). In the presence of the borrowing constraint, capital rental rate is equal to the marginal product of capital of marginal entrepreneurs (those with productivity cut-off) so is lower than̄in general. The rental rate also depends on the shape parameter φ that represents the degree of heterogeneity. When entrepreneurs are relatively more heterogeneous (lower φ), marginal producers are relatively more distant from the average active producers so rental rate is relatively lower.
The main difference between this model and Moll (2014) lies on the assumptions that human capital is accumulated and affected by public spending, g e , which is financed by taxing on capital at the policy tax rate, τ. Consequently, the government by changing the policy tax rate can affect the human capital formation, hence, changing workers' decisions on working hours and private investment on human capital via the equation (23). This in turn affects the returns on factor inputs and the dynamics of other aggregates.
The analysis 3.1 The balanced-growth path
We will from now on focus our analysis on balanced-growth path equilibrium. A balanced-growth path equilibrium of this economy is established when the physical human capital ratio, = ℎ and u stays constant over time and, =̇=ḣ ℎ = , for all
where γ denotes the balanced-growth rate. The equations (22),(23) implies that it is necessary that G(h, τk) = G(h, τκh) is a homogeneous of degree 1 with respect to human capital stock so that the economy converges to a balanced growth path equilibrium with constant u and γ.
We first consider the case that the human capital formation depends linearly and only on the existing level of human capital stock. That is,
where b is a parameter. This is the case where Lucas (1988) meets Moll (2014) . It is then straightforward to show from (21), (22), (23), provided ρ < b, that the economy model will converge to a balanced growth path equilibrium where,
Which implies that financial deepening, a higher λ, leads to a higher A, hence causing more physical human capital intensity, a higher κ, but financial deepening has no effects on working hours, u and balanced growth path rate, γ.
We then investigate the case when human capital formation depends positively on public spending. Before elaborating the analysis, it should be emphasized that because workers are borrowing constrained a positive policy tax rate τ that corresponds to non-zero public spending on human capital formation does not necessarily guarantee a balanced-growth path equilibrium in this economy. To see that, combine equations (22) and (23) to obtain,̇+ḣ
This equation implies that for a given level of human capital stock it is necessary that public spending on human capital, g e are sufficient and/or its impact on the formation of human capital is significant so that the RHS of (30) is positive. Otherwise, the economy is unable to converge to a balanced growth path where u is constant andḣ ℎ is positive. For further analytical exploration, we assume the G(h, g e ) function takes the following homogeneous of degree one form, 16
Substituting κ and γ into (21), (22),(23) and note that under a balanced-growth path equilibrium, u and κ stay constant over time, we obtain the following 3 equations for 3 variables, κ, γ and u as,
Consequently, the balanced-growth equilibrium fraction of working hour, u, and physical-human capital ratio κ are given by:
and the balanced-growth rate γ are determined by the following equation,
where ≡ 1− 1−
Proposition 1
When the following condition
is satisfied then there exists a policy tax rate that yields a positive balanced-growth path rate equilibrium for this economy.
Intuitively, this Proposition states that when financial markets are sufficiently deep so that the condition (38) is satisfied then there exists a balanced-growth path rate equilibrium.
Proof.
Step 1: We first show that if (38) is satisfied then there exists τ so that the following condition is satisfied.
Denote the LHS of (39) as m(τ), it is straightforward that for τ > 0, m(τ) is an U-shaped function of τ and is minimized at̃= 1− and () = (1− ) 1− . Rewrite the condition (38) as,
which implies that the horizontal line representing RHS of (39) interacts the vertical axis at a point higher than (). Therefore, if τ belongs to ( ,), where ,̄are two solutions of the following equation
then the condition (39) is satisfied.
Step 2: If ∈ ( ,) so that (39) is satisfied then there exists a positive solution for (37). Denote the LHS of (37) as Ψ(γ), then
Namely, the curve that represents the LHS of (37) is non-negative and strictly increasing for all γ ≥ −ρ. Because the RHS of (37) is also a non-negative number, (37) always has at least one solution. Rewrite (39) as,
which equivalently states that the horizontal line representing the RHS of (37) interacts the vertical axis at a point above Ψ(0). Consequently, there exists a unique non-negative solution 0 ≤ γ for the equation (37). □
Corollary 1
Under a balanced growth path equilibrium, economies with deeper financial markets grow with higher growth rates, have less working hours.
Proof.
The proof that under the balanced-growth path equilibrium, a higher λ leads to a higher growth rate and a lower fraction of working hours is straightforward from the two equations (35) and (37) that determine γ and u. In particular, as the parameter, λ that captures the financial deepening level increases the RHS of (37) increases. Hence, for any given policy tax rate ∈ ( ,), the solution of the equation (37) also increases. A higher balanced growth rate will lead to less working hours as implied from the equation (35). □ Next, we address the stability of this balanced growth path equilibrium. To that end, we first re-express equations (21), (22), (23) in terms of the physical human capital ratio and the fraction of working hours, we obtain the following system of two differential equations of κ and u as:
Proposition 2
The reduced linearization of the system of two non-linear differential equations (41) and (42) has two roots with opposite signs. Therefore, the equilibrium obtained the Proposition 1 is saddle point in the local sense.
Proof.
See the Appendix D. □
Taxation
Proposition 1 implies that the policy tax rate τ should not be too low, namely not lower than , and also not be too high, namely not higher than, so that there exists a balanced-growth path equilibrium. However, the effects of taxation on growth are far from trivial from the equation (37) that determines the growth rate for any ∈ ( ,). An increase in τ shifts both sides of this equation, hence it is unclear that whether the value of its positive solution increases or decreases. Similarly, since the balanced growth rate, γ also depends on the tax rate, τ, the equation (36) does not directly tell us about the effects of capital taxation on the physical human capital ratio, κ, either.
Lemma 2
For ∈ ( ,), an increase in the policy tax rate leads to lower physical human capital ratio.
Proof.
Suppose the opposite that an increase in the policy rate rate, τ leads to an increase or unchange in the physical human capital ratio, κ. Since ρ is constant and ϕ < 1, equation (34) implies that the fraction of working hours, u, must decrease. Consequently, the equation (33) implies that the growth rate, γ on the RHS must increase. However, increases in τ, κ, γ and a decrease in u leads to a decrease of the LHS but an increase of the RHS of the equation (32), which is a contradiction. □ We then address the effects of the taxation rate on growth via the following Proposition.
Proposition 3
When the economy is on its balanced-growth path equilibrium, the policy tax rate exerts inverted U-shaped effects on the growth rate.
Proof.
Denote γ(τ) as the solution of equation (37). Substituting γ(τ) back and then differentiating the equation with respect to τ we obtain,
Note that because γ(τ), μ(τ), and ν(τ) are continuous functions of τ for all ∈ ( ,), ( ) is a continuous function of τ. Additionally, since μ(τ) > 0 for all ∈ ( ,), the function's sign of the derivative of γ(τ), namely ( ) , depends only on the magnitude relation between γ(τ) and ν(τ). Particularly, γ(τ) is an increasing function of τ when the curve representing γ(τ) is above the positive sloping line representing ( ). When the curve representing γ(τ) is below that of ν(τ), γ(τ) is a decreasing function of τ. Also notice that ( ) = 1− > 0 so ν(τ) is a strictly increasing function of τ. Therefore, the two curves can not intersect tangentially, namely if the two curves intersect, they must pass through each other. The reason is that at any possible intersection point the slope of γ(τ), by definition, must be equal to zero while the slope of the line representing ν(τ) is always positive. Moreover, if there exists an intersection point then on the left (right) of this point, the curve representing γ(τ) must lie above (below) that of ν(τ) hence γ(τ) must be increasing (decreasing) with τ. 17 As a result, the two curves can possibly intersect at most one possible point.
Recall from the definition of, , and̄in (40) (43) or equivalently the curve representing γ(τ) intersects the positive sloped line representing ν(τ) at τ * . As argued above, the two curves can only intersect at most one possible point, therefore,
The underlying mechanism or intuition of the effects of taxation in this Proposition can be explained via the equation system of (32), (33), (34) as follows. The first negative effect or the cost of capital taxation on physical capital accumulation, hence on growth rate is the second term, − , in the equation (32) and it directly reduces the growth rate, γ, as shown in the equation. An increase in the policy rate directly contributes to higher rate of human capital formation and growth as shown in LHS of the equation (33) and it also lowers the physical human capital ratio, κ, as shown in Lemma 2. Since α < 1, a fall in κ has a positive effect on the first term of (32), namely the aggregated marginal product of capital. The Proposition 3 shows that when the policy tax rate is relatively low, namely ∈ ( , * ), an increase in this rate will lead to more time spent on human capital accumulation or equivalently a decrease in working hours at the labor market, higher aggregated marginal product of capital, and higher growth. By contrast, when the policy tax rate is already high, namely ∈ ( * ,), an increase in the rate will lead to more working hours and lower growth rate.
More specifically, suppose that the economy is initially at a balanced growth path equilibrium in which public spending on human capital formation is very low because of a very low tax rate. Consequently, the physical human capital ratio is very high and the equation (26) implies that the wage rate is relatively high. In this equilibrium since workers spend a high fraction of their time working at the labor market or little time for accumulating human capital and the human capital accumulation rate is very low. In the meantime, since physical human capital ratio is very high, the aggregated marginal product of capital is very low. All together leads to a very low balanced growth path rate. 18 When the government starts raising the capital tax rate to spend more on human capital formation, it distorts the accumulation of physical capital with a higher tax but at the same time leads to a fall in the physical human capital ratio. Because of diminishing returns to physical capital of the goods production function (6) and diminishing returns to existing human capital stock of the human capital accumulation technology (2), together with the associated Inada conditions, an increase in tax rate from a low level to τ * leads to increases in the human capital accumulation rate, namely the LHS of (33), and the aggregated marginal product of capital, namely the first term on the LHS of (32) and also the whole LHS of (32). As a result, the equilibrium growth rate increases. However, when the policy tax rate becomes very high, namely higher than τ * , the positive gains from public spending on human capital becomes relatively smaller so that both LHSs of (32) and (33) starts decreasing. Consequently, the implied equilibrium growth rate becomes lower with a higher tax rate.
Corollary 2
The growth maximizing tax rate and the corresponding maximized growth rate are increasing concave function of the financial deepening level.
Proof.
Substituting equation (43) back into (37) to obtain the following equation that determines the optimal policy tax rate, τ * .
( 1 − )
where ≡ [ − (1 − ) 2− + 1− ( −1 ) ]
1+
The optimal balanced growth path rate is then obtained as follows, * = 1 − (1+ ) − (47)
< 1 for α < 1, ϕ < 1 and φ > 1 it is straightforward that τ * and γ * are all increasing concave functions of parameter λ that reflects financial deepening level. □ Intuitively, as financial markets deepen, the borrowing collateral constraint of productive entrepreneurs is relaxed and productivity cut-off increases. Consequently, the aggregated marginal product of capital rises, the physical human capital ratio increases and there are more demand for effective labor by more productive active producers. The Corollary states that to yield a maximum growth rate, relatively more public spending on human capital is needed because this fiscal policy can mitigate the rise in physical human capital, hence further increasing the aggregated marginal product of capital and the equilibrium growth rate.
Policy implications
In the previous section, we analytically show that taxation exerts an inverted U-shaped effects on growth and derive the growth maximizing tax rate. Nonetheless, in the literature of public finance and endogenous growth the question of whether the government should choose tax rates that maximize the long-run growth is under debate because welfare maximizing is usually considered as the main objective of any benevolent government. 19 Theoretically, Barro (1990) in a seminal work constructs an endogenous growth model where the flow of public spending, which is financed by distortionary capital taxation, is a productive input in the aggregate production function. Barro (1990) then shows that maximizing the long-run growth is equivalent to maximizing welfare. In other words, growth maximizing fiscal policy that is financed by distortionary taxation can be rationalized. Futagami, Morita, and Shibata (1993) extends Barro (1990) to incorporate the accumulation of productive public capital stock and shows than the growth maximizing tax rate is higher than the welfare maximizing tax rate. In a recent work, Misch, Gemmell, and Kenller (2013) generalizes the frameworks of both Barro (1990) and Futagami, Morita, and Shibata (1993) in an endogenous growth model with various combinations of assumptions related to the roles of public and private capital. Misch, Gemmell, and Kenller (2013) then numerically shows that while growth maximizing and welfare maximizing tax rates can be either equivalent or different from each other, they translate into relatively small differences in growth rates. In particular, for models with flow of public services in lines with Barro (1990) the differences in welfare levels is relatively small, hence growth maximization can be appropriate second-best policy for the benevolent government. Because we focus on tractably analytical analysis in a model where public spending on human capital formation is flow as in Barro (1990) we assume that the government chooses the tax rate that maximizing growth. 20 When the government follows the fiscal policy strategy that maximizes growth, theoretical results from the Lemma 1, Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 predict that as the level of financial deepening increases the economy will have: (1) higher aggregate productivity, (2) higher growth rate. Consequently, countries with deeper financial markets tend to have (3) less fraction of working hours and spend more time on education. We then compare these theoretical predictions to data from OECD countries using macroeconomic data from the Penn World Table 9 .0 (PWT 9.0), updated Financial Development and Structure Data-set, and Barro-Lee Education Attainment Data-set. 21 Figure 2 shows that among OECD countries, those economies with deeper financial markets tend to: 22 i. Have higher levels of Total Factor Productivity (TFP).
ii. Have higher economic growth rates.
iii. Have less average annual hour worked.
iv. Have higher average years of schooling for the age group beyond 15 that can be considered as a proxy the average time engaging in education. 23
In other words, data from OECD countries reveals that financial deepening exerts positive effects on productivity, growth and years of schooling, which is consistent with our theoretical predictions in the model where public services are a productive input of human capital formation. There are two comments worth mentioning here. The first one is as shown at the begining of the Section 3, incorporating financial frictions and productivity heterogeneity in line with Moll (2014) into the conventional Uzawa-Lucas model where public services has no productive role in human capital accumulation can not attain the theoretical result that financial development has positive effects on growth and time spent on education but negative effects on working hours. Consequently, public spending on human capital accumulation that is financed by distortionary taxation might not be rationalized in these model settings. The second comment is that these empirical results in this section do not mean to provide a thoroughly empirical analysis on the effects of financial development on productivity and growth across countries but just to amalgamate the theoretical results with the main empirics that motivate the research. For the huge literature on the relationship between financial development, factor accumulation and growth and related empirical work see for example Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) and Levine (2005) among many others. 
Sensitivity to taxation scheme
In this paper, capital/wealth taxation scheme, namely τa, is assumed to keep the model analytically tractable. 24 As taxation scheme specification is an important assumption and may result different theoretical implications it is worth discussing other taxation schemes in this section. An important alternative is the capital income taxation scheme in which tax revenue is equal to τ k rk, where τ k is the capital income tax rate and r is the capital rental rate defined as in (27). Let us define( ) as τ k r and it can be shown that( ) is an increasing convex function of τ k . Consequently, it is possible, with more complicated algebra or possibly numerical analysis for some parts, to show that the difference between the gains in the aggregated marginal product of capital and the cost of capital income taxation τ k r is still an inverted U-shaped function of the policy tax rate. The growth maximizing policy tax rate can also be numerically derived and shown as an increasing function of financial deepening level. Another taxation scheme is lump-sum tax on entrepreneurs. Under this lump-sum taxation scheme, the model would reduce to a steady state equilibrium growth model that is close to the model in Itskhoki and Moll (2019) . More specifically, we would yield a steady state equilibrium in which there is no positive balancedgrowth path rate, therefore working hours and growth rate are independent of the financial deepening level.
In addition, it can also be labor income taxation scheme. When workers are allowed to save and participate into the capital markets, taxing labor income will influence their behaviors in saving and accumulating human capital, hence, potentially resulting more insights and other theoretical implications. However, under the handto-mouth assumption, workers' consumption is equal to their labor income, which in turn is equal to a fraction of output, (1 − λ)y, in this model. On the balanced growth path equilibrium, this term is proportional to capital stock, hence, resulting similar results as taxation on capital/assets.
Concluding remarks
This paper constructs a highly tractable human-capital based endogenous growth model with financial frictions and productivity heterogeneity to explore the effects of financial deepening and taxation on factor accumulation, working hours and growth. It shows that the model has a balanced-growth path equilibrium whose rate depends on the financial deepening level and fiscal. The theoretical analysis also reveals that the model's predictions are consistent with data from OECD countries with regards to financial deepening, factor accumu-lation and working hours. There are several possible extensions from this paper. One is to have more policy instruments and to allow dynamic inter-temporal government budget constraints so that the government can participate directly into the capital market and conduct optimal policies with more freedom. Another is to add more objectives to the optimal policies such as reducing distortions in the capital markets and optimizing entrepreneurs and/or workers' welfare in richer settings.
Proof of the proposition Proposition 1
In this economy, the aggregate output denoted by y can be obtained by summing the amounts of homogenous final goods produced by all active entrepreneurs, i.e. entrepreneurs with idiosyncratic productivity higher than the cut-off z:
Substituting the optimal labor demand (11) into the labor market clearing condition (18), we obtain
which then implies that:
Plugging this equation back to (48) we obtain the aggregate output as follows:
where A is the endogenous measured TFP
Substituting capital demand from (10) into (17) and recall that z is i.i.d we obtain the following capital market equilibrium equation
which in turn determines the productivity cut-off = 1 . The wage rate, w, can be obtained by substituting (49) into the definition of π (13):
Similarly, the capital return, r, can be expressed as:
The budget constraint of the government becomes
We then derive the dynamic equation of the aggregate capital stock, k, by first aggregating wealth of all en-trepreneurṡ=
and then dividing entrepreneurs into the inactive group ( < ) and the active group ( ≥ ), thereforė
where the third and forth equal signs are implied by the definition of X in (19), in (12), and π in (49).
Appendix D
Proof of the proposition Proposition 2
Rewrite the system of two non-linear differential equations (41) and (42) as:
where ( , ) ≡ [ −1 1− − 1− 1− (1 − ) − − ] , ( , ) ≡ [ 1− 1− − ] The Jacobian matrix of the non-linear system (51) evaluated at the equilibrium obtained from the Proposition 1 is:
The trace of this Jacobian matrix is equal to:
Since u ∈ (0, 1) and ϕ ∈ (0, 1), the value of trace ( ) can be positive, negative and equal to zero. In the meantime, the determinant of this Jacobian matrix is equal to:
Since α ∈ (0, 1) and ϕ ∈ (0, 1), it is straightforward that the value of this determinant of this Jacobian matrix is always negative. As a result, the reduced linearization of the system of two non-linear differential equations (41) and (42) has two roots with opposite signs. Therefore, the equilibrium obtained the Proposition 1 is saddle point in the local sense. Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2015) for a thorough review of this literature. 5 Moll (2014) introduces productivity persistence into the previous work of Angeletos (2007) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) , and shows that self-financing can undo capital mis-allocation and reduce the long-run steady state TFP losses when the shocks are sufficiently persistent. 6 See for example Mino (2015) for the discussion of AK endogenous growth model with productivity heterogeneity. 7 When G(h, g e ) is a linear function of only the level of existing human capital stock, h this specification reverts to the original Uzawa-Lucas setup. 8 For instance, in Japan as of 2015 there are only 227 private elementary schools out of total 20,601 elementary schools and out of a total of 10,484 junior high schools, only 774 are private. The Japanese government also provides subsidies for raising children until junior high school.
Notes
9 An important implication of this assumption is that since workers do not participate in the capital markets, their behavior is not directly affected by the process of capital accumulation and that capital market equilibrium is determined only by the supply and demand for capital of active and inactive entrepreneurs. 10 See the Appendix for detailed derivation. 11 As it will be shown later, entrepreneur consumption is also linear in his wealth so the imposition of consumption tax on entrepreneurs will lead to similar quantitative results. 12 It is straightforward to show that rental capital market setting is equivalent to a setup where entrepreneurs own and accumulate capital and are allowed to trade a risk-free bond. In addition, a positive physical capital depreciation rate only complicates algebra without any insights so the rate is assumed to zero in this model. 13 See Buera and Shin (2013) for further discussions of this borrowing constraint and Nguyen (2019) for the case when the borrowing leverage ratio is endogenous. 14 See the Appendix B for derivation. 15 See the Appendix C for the detailed derivation. 16 A CES function form will complicate the algebra but obtain similar theoretical implications. 17 Suppose the curve representing γ(τ) lies below that of ν(τ) on the left of an interaction point then by definition γ(τ) must be decreasing on the left of an interaction point. However, ν(τ) is always strictly increasing with all τ and if the curve representing γ(τ) lies below that of ν(τ), γ(τ) must be increasing so that it can interact with the curve representing ν(τ), which is contradictory. 18 The growth rate is close to zero when the policy tax rate is close to the lower bound . It may be more intuitive to interpret a positive when we explicitly model a positive depreciation rate for human capital. In this case, the lower bound for can be interpreted as the minimum public spending to maintain a fixed level of human capital stock. 19 From the practical fiscal policy making perspective, growth maximizing policy is sometimes considered as the second-best policy since it is difficult to estimate the preferences of economic agents such as households in order to conduct welfare maximizing policy. 20 Moreover, unlike Moll (2014) and Itskhoki and Moll (2019) this is an "endogenous" growth model and on the balanced-growth-path, assets together with other variables such as capital stock grows at the BGP rate over time, hence, the (stationary) distribution of individual entrepreneurs by assets does not exist. Consequently, it is not feasible to conduct welfare and efficiency analysis in a Ramsey policy sense based on an aggregate weighed welfare function for heterogeneous entrepreneurs. 21 See the Appendix A for the description of these Data-sets. 22 Similar results using another financial deepening indicator, Liquid Liabilities (M3) over GDP, are available upon request. 23 The average years of schooling can also be considered as a proxy for the level of human capital in the literature. 24 Itskhoki and Moll (2019) also assumes the same taxation scheme as a fraction of entrepreneurs' asset position but they call it as saving tax.
